This paper reexamines the evidence on the border effect, the finding that the border drives a wedge between domestic and foreign prices. We argue that the border effect can be inflated by the volatility and persistence of the nominal exchange rate and by the cross-country heterogeneity in the distribution of within-country price differentials. We develop a simple framework to separate the border effect from these confounding factors. Using price data from Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (2001), we show that after controlling for the confounding factors the border effect between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Japan is negligible.
Introduction
One of the salient findings in empirical international economics is that an administrative border between geographical regions reduces the volume of trade and leads to a price discrepancy across these regions. This regularity has been called the border effect and has been documented in numerous studies. In an influential set of papers, Engel and Rogers (1996 , 2001 find that even after controlling for distance, there is a substantial difference in prices across the U.S.-Canadian border. Parsley and Wei (2001) perform a similar exercise on U.S.-Japanese data and find a large border effect. Using data on quantities, McCallum (1995) finds that intranational trade flows are, ceteris paribus, 22 times larger than international trade flows. In a similar vein, provincial borders in Canada (Helliwell and Verdier, 2001) and state borders in the U.S.A. (Wolf, 2000) account for a significant fraction of the decreased trade flows across provinces and states relative to trade flows within states and provinces. Furthermore, Ceglowski (2003) finds that provincial borders in Canada account for a significant fraction of the discrepancy of prices across provinces. This has important welfare implications and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) include the border effect in their list of the major puzzles in international economics.
The presence of a border effect in and of itself is not surprising. However, the magnitude of the estimated border effect is surprisingly -many would say unbelievablylarge. The border between the U.S. and Canada, after controlling for distance and other characteristics, is equivalent to 75,000 miles (Table 3, p. 1117, Engel and Rogers (1996) ). Parsley and Wei (2001) find the border between the U.S. and Japan is equivalent to 43,000 trillion miles (note that the distance to the Moon is a mere 238,900 miles). Likewise, there are few reasons to believe that impediments to trade between states or provinces are large enough to affect trade flows.
1 Finding a significant border effect where it should not be found, and finding coefficients that are orders of magnitude larger than one can plausibly defend, raises doubts about the validity of the empirical methodology used to isolate the border effect.
The key innovation of Engel and Rogers (1996) was to use city-level price information to estimate the quantitative importance of an international border on price differentials. Their insight was that n-city prices could be transformed into n(n-1)/2 city-pair combinations, so that the border effect could be measured as the difference observed in the sample of cross-border pairs relative to the within-country pairs. One difficulty with this approach, however, is that significant differences in the distribution of within-country prices across countries can confound the border effect. We call this the country heterogeneity effect. We show below that in the U.S.-Canada case, correcting for differences in the within-country volatility of price differentials alone eliminates the border effect.
The second important difference between cross-border and within-country pairs is that the exchange rate affects only the cross-border pairs. This has two implications for cross-border pairs relative to within-country pairs. First, because nominal exchange rates are highly volatile, cross-border pairs are automatically more volatile relative to within-country pairs (the exchange rate effect). Second, movements in the nominal exchange rate are highly persistent.
Holding the variance of the innovations to the nominal exchange rate constant, the more persistent the shocks, the higher the variance of the real exchange rate (the persistence effect).
Hence, the border effect is confounded with the volatility and persistence of nominal exchange rates. We are not the first to identify this issue. For example, Engel and Rogers (2001) discuss possible ways of correcting for the exchange rate effect when more than two countries are analyzed. Our contribution is to introduce a unified framework to decompose and estimate the border effect, correcting for these possible biases in the border coefficient, even in the twocountry case.
We use price data from Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (2001) to estimate the border effect for U.S./Canadian and U.S./Japanese cities, respectively. In contrast to previous studies, we show that the border effect is economically and statistically negligible after accounting for factors that confound the border effect. In the U.S.-Canada sample, correction for cross-country heterogeneity alone reduces the border effect from over 71,000 km to 47 km. In the case of the U.S. and Japan, the role of exchange rate volatility is more important. After correcting for the exchange rate effect and the persistence effect, we find that the half-life of price differentials between U.S.-U.S. city pairs and between U.S.-Japan city pairs is statistically and economically indistinguishable.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we motivate the econometric specification that is conventionally used to estimate the border effect. In Section 3, we discuss potential problems in using the standard econometric specification to estimate the border effect.
Specifically, we argue that country heterogeneity, persistence and nominal exchange rate effects are likely to upwardly bias estimates of the border effect. Then we present a simple method to control for these biases. In Section 4, we use U.S./Canada and U.S./Japan price data sets analyzed in previous studies to re-estimate the border effect after correcting for the biases we identify. We conclude in Section 5.
Trade Costs and Dispersion of Prices
In this section we derive the estimating equation used in much of the literature on border effects in goods prices. We begin with the law of one price (LOOP) implied by arbitrage in goods markets. Specifically, the no-arbitrage condition implies that identical goods should sell for the same price in different locations, after adjusting for trade costs and differences in currency denomination. 2 To fix ideas, define k it P as the price of good k in location i at time t and t S as the exchange rate that converts prices from location j's currency to location i's currency. k ij T is the (iceberg) cost of trade between locations i and j for per unit of good k, and
is the real exchange rate. Note that the specification of the trade cost here is very general and includes the cost of shipping (which could be proportional to distance), tariffs, and any other administrative barrier that might impede the flow of goods. Then, the law of one price states Then, the standard deviation of the real exchange rate is proportional to the log of the trade costs:
The distance equivalent of the border-that is, the border effect-is equal to Engel and Rogers (1996 , 2001 ) and the subsequent literature use the standard deviation of changes in the real exchange rate as the dependant variable in (2). Taking the difference of the real exchange rate helps reduce the persistence of the real exchange. We 4 We follow the literature in making this assumption, however, it is not at all obvious that the real exchange rate would generally exhibit such a distribution. See Coleman (2005) for a discussion of the behavior of the real exchange rate with storage and capacity constraints on transport. 5 Parsley and Wei (2001) suggest an alternative measure of the border effect: follow the literature and use specification (2) to estimate the border effect. In the tests below we use the standard deviation of both level and changes in the real exchange rate.
Potential Problems in Isolating the Border Effect

Country heterogeneity effect
The first problem that arises in estimating (2) stems from possible differences in within-country price dispersion that become confounded with the border effect. For concreteness, suppose that the two countries are Canada and the U.S. and cities are the relevant geographical units. We denote pairs of cities by UU (US-US), UC (US-Canada) and CC (Canada-Canada). The border effect in (2) measures by how much a ceteris paribus transition from an intra-national city pair (UU or CC) to an international city pair (UC) raises the average volatility of the price differential. Intuitively, the border effect should reflect factors that are specific to UC pairs, and
should not include factors that stem from differences between UU and CC pairs. To put this in the language of the program evaluation/treatment effects literature, the border coefficient should pick up the effect associated with the treatment of crossing the border. If, in the absence of the border treatment, city-pairs differ for other (non-border related) reasons (e.g. more competition or more variety could yield greater price dispersion across US city pairs relative to Canadian city pairs), one should condition on this heterogeneity to isolate the effect of the treatment. Smith (2004) discusses the consequences of ignoring such heterogeneity in the benchmark group.
In practice, there is heterogeneity across cities as well as countries. As we show below, it turns out to be important how the dispersion for each city pair is decomposed into a city and country contribution. To simplify exposition, we omit for now the error term and controls for distance and commodities. For all pairs, the volatility of the real exchange rate is described by:
where UC, UU, CC are dummy variables for UC, UU, and CC city pairs, D s is a city dummy equal to one if s=i or s=j and zero otherwise and N is the number of cities. Without loss of generality, suppose that 1,…,k cities are in Canada. The average volatility for types of city pairs is then given by:
US-Canada:
Canada-Canada: 2 
One possible identification strategy is to follow Engel and Rogers (1996) . ER effectively substitute (7) and (8) into (3) to eliminate CC ij and UU ij so that (see Appendix for derivations):
The country heterogeneity is now absorbed in the city-fixed effects. The coefficients on the border dummy in the ER specification measures the increase in the volatility relative to the average volatility for intracountry pairs. The implicit assumption is that U C γ γ = , i.e., countryspecific contributions to volatility are identical. The problem, as we show below, is that in the U.S-Canada case, in particular, country effects are quite different. When this happens, using the average intranational volatility as the benchmark can be confusing because one finds a border effect even when from the U.S. perspective crossing the border effectively reduces the variance of the real exchange rate. In the absence of a structural model, we do not know if the arithmetic average, or any other combination of within-country variances, is the appropriate benchmark for evaluating the effect of the border.
We propose an alternative decomposition into country and city effects. One can rearrange terms in (3) as follows (see Appendix for derivations):
where ˆs
if s is a US city (i.e., deviation of the city effect from the national mean), are not collinear with other right-hand side variables. 8 The implicit assumption for identification of the border effect is that the average city effect is the same across countries.
Without loss of generality the average city effect is normalized to zero. (10) and (9) is purely algebraic, (10) and (9) have the same explanatory power (e.g., the same R 2 ) and one can back out coefficients in specification (10) from specification (9) and vice versa. To get further intuition, abstract from city-specific effects by setting 0 s α = for all s. In the ER specification (9), the border effect is equal to ( ) σ σ σ = > shows that the border coefficient in (9) mixes the border effect with differences in the average volatility of price differentials for intranational pairs across countries. Intuitively, the international price differentials reflect both the effect of crossing the border -the object of interest -and the effect of trading with cities located in a country with greater (or lesser) price dispersion.
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The implications are easy to grasp. First, treating UU and CC pairs as a homogenous group when they are not can produce misleading results. Second, to identify correctly the border effect, one has to control for within-country differences by introducing country-specific dummies as in (10). 11 Third, if the border effect measured by the coefficient on the UC dummy is between the estimates of the coefficients on the UU and CC dummies, one cannot claim to have found a significant border effect. Hence, the border dummy UC must be statistically (and economically) greater than the coefficients on the UU and CC dummies. Of course, if UU is the omitted category, then the Border coefficient must be statistically greater than zero and greater than the coefficient on the CC dummy. The upshot is that the researcher needs to augment (2) with the CC dummy as follows:
where Border is the dummy variable for US-Canada pairs, city-specific effects are constrained as in (10) β ≠ ) and, therefore, the researcher should compute 10 If we had powers to conduct a controlled experiment, we would take two cities in the same country, draw a border between them and measure how the border changes the volatility of the price differential. In reality, one has to rely on specifications like (9) or (10) to compute the counterfactual. 11 If it were clear why price-differentials systematically differ across cities and across countries, one could condition on the precise factors that explain those differences. In the absence of such a theory, however, a combination of city-and country-dummies must be used to proxy for those effects.
the border effect relative to the US-US and Canada-Canada benchmark. We suggest using a conservative estimate of the border effect:
so that the border effect measures the minimal increase in the transition from an intranational to an international pairs of locations.
12
We show below that there is a significant difference between within-country volatility measures for the Canada and the U.S., and failing to account for that difference dramatically increases the estimated border coefficient.
The persistence effect
In the case we considered above, arbitrage is assumed to be instantaneous, that is, the arbitrager can reallocate any quantity of any good within an arbitrarily small time period. Furthermore, the implicit but critical assumption in deriving (2) is that the analyzed real exchange rates have the same persistence and volatility of innovations. In practice, it is far more likely that adjustment costs prevent instantaneous arbitrage and that there is gradual convergence of the real exchange rate back to and perhaps within the inaction band. Because of this gradual adjustment, Taylor and Taylor (2004) observe that it is important to know how much the real exchange rate deviates from its steady state and how quickly it reverts to equilibrium. Put differently, it is interesting to divide the variance of the real exchange rate into innovation variance and propagation. The relevant objects are then the size of the shocks to the real exchange rate and the speed at which those shocks are dissipated.
Measures of volatility such as (12) we pick the smallest border coefficient and the alternative estimate of the border may be dramatically larger. However, without a structural model, it is impossible to reconcile two different estimates of the same border. Therefore, we report the more conservative estimate. 13 To see the point, consider the following example where the real exchange rate follows the process exchange rates with the same band [-t,t] can have different variances because some of the real exchange rates are more persistent or have more volatile innovations than other real exchange rates. To illustrate the point, consider two real exchange rates which have the same band [-t,t] and all other characteristics but have different persistence. If a more persistent real exchange rate happens to be associated with international pairs of locations, then a greater variance of the real exchange rate would be attributed to the border when in fact there is no genuine border effect in going from one country to another. Hence, it is important to control for differences in the persistence of real exchange rates.
14 Persistence in the real exchange rate is interesting in itself as a measure of market integration. Empirical work suggests that those factors that one might expect to result in a breakdown of the law of one price also contribute to higher persistence in real exchange rate differentials. For example, Parsley and Wei (1996) , Ceglowski (2003) , Imbs et al (2003) and others find that distance increases the persistence of real exchange rates. Crucini and Shintani (2002) find that the persistence of the real exchange rate is systematically different across intraand international city pairs.
In summary, the border coefficient in equations (2) and (4) reflects the extent to which the variance of international price differentials differs from the variance of intra-national price differentials. The variances are a function of the persistence in the price differentials as well as the size of the shocks to the price differentials (the innovations). Thus, it will be important to disentangle these effects both within and across countries to understand the sources of the border effect. In what follows, we use the half-life (HL) of an innovation to the real exchange rate as a measure of persistence and the standard deviations of innovations to the real exchange rate as a measure of the size of the shocks to the real exchange rate. 
The nominal exchange rate effect
A final problem with interpreting the border effect based on differences in the volatility of real exchange rates is that the behavior of international price pairs is confounded with nominal exchange rate volatility. In effect, intracountry city pairs have a fixed exchange rate while intercountry city pairs face floating exchange rates. Since volatile nominal exchange rate affects only international city pairs, the volatility of the real exchange rate induced by changes in the nominal exchange rate is fully attributed to the border effect. Moreover, the nominal exchange rate is not only volatile, it is also highly persistent (e.g., Meese and Rogoff 1983) , which further increases the volatility of the real exchange rate for international city pairs.
Hence, there is an overlap between the persistence effect and the nominal exchange rate effect.
To identify the border effect, one has to control for the nominal exchange rate when comparing intra-and international city pairs. Engel and Rogers (2001) use multiple countries to separate the border effect from the volatility of nominal exchange rates. 16 We suggest an alternative procedure that is applicable to two-country cases. Specifically, we condition the log ratio of prices on the nominal exchange rate and consider variation in the log ratio of prices that is unrelated to movements in the nominal exchange rate. Our econometric specification is:
where ln( )
p that is uncorrelated with changes in the nominal exchange rate. Note that we include the current value of the nominal exchange rate in the right-hand side of (13), which may introduce simultaneity bias in the estimates of the coefficients. On the other hand, if the current value is not included in the list of regressors, k ijt ω includes variation that stems from innovations in the nominal exchange rate and, hence, using the standard deviation of k ijt ω should bias the estimate of the border effect upwards. In our applications we find that in either case the qualitative results are similar, which is not surprising given stickiness of prices. Of course, for intranational city pairs (13) reduces to
Note that if cities are small relative to the economy, each city takes the exchange rate as given, i.e., there is no feedback from discrepancy in prices between any two cities to the exchange rate. Indeed, it is unlikely that price discrepancy for any good in any city pair 16 Specifically, Engel and Rogers include ( ) ijt s σ as a regressor in (2). Note that this does not fix the persistence and country heterogeneity effects and, hence, these authors still find a significant border effect.
influences bilateral trade in such a way so as to affect the exchange rate between two nations. 17, 18 Importantly, in (13) Analogously to (11), we can now estimate the effect of the border on the persistence of the real exchange rate and the volatility of innovations to the real exchange rate from Here we assume implicitly that the share of variation in prices at the city level due to macroeconomic shocks is small. In our data, the share is tiny (about 5-10%) and thus macroeconomic shocks are relatively unimportant and our quantitative and qualitative conclusions should not be sensitive to the relaxing this assumption. 18 We test if the assumption of no dynamic feedback holds in the data and we cannot reject the null that lags of k ijt p are jointly zero in a regression analogous to (13) with nominal exchange rate as the dependent variable.
to real exchange rate. Thus, this approach solves all the problems we have identified above. It controls for the volatility of the nominal exchange rate for international city pairs in the twocountry case. It separates the persistence and volatility of innovations in price differentials.
To illustrate the importance of the nominal exchange rate volatility, we also compute half-lives and variance of innovations from:
where we do not control for the nominal exchange rate effect. By re-estimating (14) and (15) (14) and (15), we can assess the effect of the nominal exchange rate on the estimates of the border effect.
Observe that, in contrast to other studies, we do not restrict intercepts and slopes in (13) or (16) to be the same across i, j, and k because imposing the same 1 { ,..., } l ψ ψ for all i, j, and k can produce misleading results if the underlying adjustment processes are heterogeneous (Pesaran and Smith 1995) . For example, Imbs et al (2005) show that this restriction biases upwards estimated half-lives of the real exchange rate.
Discussion
In summary, we have identified three problems with using price dispersion to estimate the border effect. First, to identify the border effect one has to control for cross-country heterogeneity in the distribution of prices within countries. Second, the volatility of the nominal exchange rate will in and of itself bias the border coefficient upward since it only affects crossborder city pairs. Finally, equation (2) can be justified by instantaneous arbitrage while the adjustment of real exchange rate is likely to be gradual. Thus, in estimating the border effect one has to control for the persistence of the real exchange rate.
19 Note that we use estimates of half-lives and ( ) (14) and (15). To verify the importance of the bias for our conclusions, we use bootstrap as in Kilian (1998) and Inoue and Kilian (2002) to correct for the finite sample bias in the estimates of HL even for integrated series. Specifically, we resample residuals from the model (13) Meese and Rogoff (1983) motivate this process for the nominal exchange rate) and then use this model to construct bootstrap replications of the data. This approach is similar to Kilian (1999) . The qualitative results do not change for bias-corrected estimates of the halflives.
To address these three issues, we suggest that the persistence of real exchange rates and the volatility of innovations to real exchange rates should be considered separately as in specifications (14) and (15) even in the two-country case. In particular, specification (15) measures the effect of the border on the size of innovations to price differentials after controlling for the nominal exchange rate and country heterogeneity effects. Likewise, specification (14) measures the effect of the border on the speed of adjustment in prices after controlling for the country heterogeneity, persistence and nominal exchange rate effects. This approach provides a unified framework to control/correct for the identified biases (country heterogeneity, persistence, nominal exchange rate) and to investigate how the border affects volatility and persistence of price differentials.
4 A Re-estimation of the Border Effect for Canada-U.S. and Japan-U.S. Pairs
In this section we apply our method to estimate the border effect on the volatility and speed of convergence of price differentials. To contrast the results with previous findings, we use the data collected by Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (2001) who find large border effects for U.S./Canada and U.S./Japan respectively. 20 Detailed discussion of the data can be found in Engel and Rogers (1996) 23 We explore the implications of this below. Table 2 follows ER's procedure for estimating the border effect (see Table 3 in Engel and Rogers (1996) ). In the first column of panel A we estimate equation (2) β β can result in large changes in the estimates of the border effect. In any case, the order of magnitude is the same.
U.S.-Canada
The effect of within-country differences (the country heterogeneity effect) on the estimated border effect can be seen by adding the CC dummy to the regression (2) using the identification strategy in equation (10). Our conjecture is that by pooling UU and CC pairs, the researcher overstates the border effect. To confirm this intuition, we estimate (11) and report the results in the second column. We find that the key coefficient 2 β in (2) is sensitive to the inclusion of the CC dummy while 1 β remains essentially unchanged. In panel A, using ER's dependent variable, the coefficient 2 β for the pooled regression remains statistically significant but drops from 12.026 to 4.148 thus making the border effect fall from 71,438 km to 47 km. In panel B, inclusion of the CC dummy causes the border coefficient to fall from 503 billion km to 100 million km.
As we argue in Section 3.1, the difference in the estimate of the border effect is driven by the country heterogeneity effect. In particular, under the ER specification differences in the volatility of real exchange rate for UU and CC pairs are absorbed by the city dummies. This conjecture is confirmed by inspection of coefficients on the city dummies in Table 3 . Canadian cities (the shaded rows) are systematically negative while the coefficients on city dummies for U.S. cities are systematically positive. Once we control for the differences across countries (specification (11); Table 3 , column 2), the volatility of UC and CC pairs is measured by the coefficient on the Border and CC dummy and the coefficients on city dummies do not have any pattern. We should note that there is no economic theory to help us distinguish between the ER specification and the one we propose. We believe that our specification is the most sensible approach given the nature of the country-specific variation in the data, but at a minimum, our results suggest that the border coefficient is highly sensitive to the assumption one makes about the source of variation and the relevant benchmark for measuring the border effect. (15) and (14). Estimates of the coefficients on log distance between cities suggest that, ceteris paribus, larger distance is associated with increased persistence and volatility of innovations. As we expected, controlling for intranational heterogeneity (by adding a CC dummy; column 2) reduces the size of the border effect. In particular, the border effect falls from 14.5 million km to 120 km and from 3,117 km to 1,005 km for ( ) k ijt σ η and half-lives respectively.
The enormous border effect that remains in ( )
The conclusions change dramatically once we control for the volatility of the nominal exchange rate as in (13) Table A1 . This can be seen by comparing panels A and B of Figure 2 . Panel A shows that the distribution of half-lives of UC 26 We choose l=6 to keep our results comparable to ER's and to control for seasonal variation. We include monthly dummies in (16) to control for seasonal factors. 27 Other studies (e.g., Parsley and Wei 1996) can have different estimates of half-lives because they use alternative ways to compute the half-lives (e.g., analyze only the largest root of the lag polynomial). 28 For U.S./Canada case, half-lives greater than 10 years are coded as missing (less than 2% of the sample). The conclusions we reach here and in the rest of the paper do not change when we explicitly control for censoring of half-lives using truncated regressions.
pairs is shifted to the right of intracountry pairs. Using these fixed-exchange-rate counterfactuals, we estimate the border effect on the volatility of innovations to the real exchange rate (as in (15)) and the persistence of the real exchange rate (as in (14)). The results are reported in column 3 (no control for country heterogeneity effect) and column 4 (control for country heterogeneity effect) of Table 4 .
Distance continues to be associated with increased persistence and volatility of innovations in the price ratio as the coefficients on log distance are positive and statistically significant in all cases. The implied border effect greatly diminishes relative to the case when we do not control for the nominal exchange rate in the real exchange rate for international city pairs. For example, the border effect on the half-life decreases from 1,005 km (column 2, panel B) to 1 (column 4, panel B), where in the latter case we control for the volatility of the nominal exchange rate and differences in within-country heterogeneity. Likewise, the border effect on the volatility of innovations further falls from 120 km (column 2, panel A) to zero km (column 4, panel A) with the coefficient on the Border dummy changing the sign to negative. Again, note the importance of the country heterogeneity effect by comparing columns 3 and 4 in Table   4 . Engel and Rogers (1996) argue that the large border effect cannot be completely explained by the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. They find that the border effect remains large when price differentials are measured by the relative exchange rate measured as ( )
P is the price of good k in city i at time t, P it is the Consumer Price Index for city i at time t (descriptive statistics are in Appendix Table A3 ).
Clearly, RER does not inflate dispersion for international pairs as the real exchange rate does.
We reproduce their large estimate of the border effect for These results suggest that after controlling for the country heterogeneity effect (by including the CC dummy) differences between the cross-border and within-country pairs are largely driven by exchange rate movements. The results are consistent with Mussa (1986) who argues that movements in the real exchange rate are driven by the nominal exchange rate since prices are sticky. The country heterogeneity effect explains most of the border effect when the dependent variable is the variance of the change in the real exchange rate. When the dependent variable is the variance of the real exchange rate, nominal exchange rates are the key source of shocks that cause cross-border pairs to exhibit a "border effect" and the persistence of nominal exchange rates is the source of persistent cross-border price differentials. After removing the exchange rate effect, international price differentials behave similar to intranational price differentials. To the extent a border exists, the border is the nominal exchange rate. Likewise, controlling for country heterogeneity eliminates the border effect in the volatility of innovations in and persistence of the relative exchange rate. 30 U.S. cities are Denver CO, Indianapolis IN, New Orleans LA, St. Louis MO, Omaha NE, New York NY, Columbus OH, EL Paso TX, Ft. Worth TX, Houston TX. Japanese cities are Sapporo, Sendai, Chiba, Yokohama, Niigata, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Okayama, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Kagoshima. The thresholds are 300,000 and 500,000 in population for U.S. and Japanese cities respectively. More details can be found in Parsley and Wei (2001) . The data are available at David Parsley's website: http://mba.vanderbilt.edu/david.parsley/Research.htm. The price data analyzed in PW and ER are from different sources and thus not comparable. PW use price data collected the American Chamber of Commerce, while ER use price data collected by Bureau of Labor Statistics. 31 As in the U.S./Canada case, panel unit root tests reject the presence of a stochastic trend in the real exchange rate (Table A2 ) so that the variance of real exchange rate is well-defined. for U.S.-Japan (UJ) pairs, which is consistent with real exchange rate being persistent.
U.S.-Japan
Following the previous analysis of the U.S./Canada case, we estimate equation (2) Table 6 , Panel A and B.
The border effect implied by the estimates is of a truly cosmic size, which is consistent with PW's estimates (Table 1, To verify this hypothesis, we examine the volatility and persistence of innovations in the real exchange rate. Specifically, we estimate (16) with l=4 and report the means of the estimated half-lives and ( ) k ijt σ η in Appendix Table A1. 33 Half-lives for international city pairs are considerably larger than half-lives for intranational pairs. The differences are particularly striking for UU (2.2 quarters) and UJ (14.5 quarters) pairs with JJ (5.5 quarters) pairs in between of these two extremes (see Panel A, Figure 4) . 34 Volatility of innovations is larger for international pairs (0.195) than for intranational pairs (0.120 for UU and 0.061 for JJ).
32 PW report a different estimate because they use polynomial in distance while we use log of distance. Also, we analyze only a sub-sample of PW's cities. 33 We choose l=4 to control for seasonal variation (the data are quarterly). For the same reason we also include seasonal dummies. 34 The average half-life for intranational pairs deserves a comment. Observing 4.2 half-life for JJ pairs is generally consistent with finding half-lives of or under one year (see discussion above). On the other hand, the half-life of 1.5 quarters for UU pairs appears somewhat low. Parsley and Wei (1996) use the similar data and find that the half-life for tradable goods is in 4-6 quarter range. Parsley and Wei, however, use approximate half-lives based on the largest root of the lag polynomial. We were able to reproduce their results when we use the approximate halflife. In contrast, the half-life based on impulse response function takes into account all eigenroots and, consequently, can lead to different estimates of the half-lives if the short run dynamics is important. This is exactly
After regressing half-lives and ( ) k ijt σ η on log distance, border dummy and other controls, we find border effects equivalent to galactic distances. Even after controlling for the country heterogeneity effect, the border effect is greater than 1 trillion km for half-lives (column 2, Panel B, Table 7 ) and the volatility of innovations ( ) k ijt σ η (column 2, Panel A, Table 7 ). Hence, ( ) k ijt q σ is significantly more volatile because the half-life is significantly longer and innovations are significantly large for international pairs than for intranational pairs.
Again it is hardly plausible that border induces such impediments to elimination of price differentials and the volatility of the nominal exchange rate is a more likely explanation for finding enormous border effects.
Indeed, when we control for the volatility of the nominal exchange rate as in (13), 35 the average fixed-exchange-rate counterfactual for the half-life for international pairs equals 4.1 quarters which is less than the average half-life of JJ pairs (Appendix Table A1 ; also compare panels A and B in Figure 4) . Likewise, the counterfactual volatility of innovations is 0.146 which is comparable to the volatility of innovations in the price ratio for UU pairs (Appendix Table A1 ). This translates into a modest border effect in the volatility of k ijt ω (315 km) and no border effect in the half-lives (column 4, Panels A and B respectively, Table 7 ). Note that the coefficient on the Border dummy is not statistically significant in both the half-life and the ( ) k ijt σ ω regressions while the distance continues to significantly contribute to explaining the variation in half-lives and ( ) k ijt σ ω . Also note the importance of controlling for country heterogeneity effect, i.e., the border effect is larger in column 3 (no control for the country heterogeneity effect) than in column 4 (control for the country heterogeneity effect).
In summary, if the U.S. and Japan had a fixed exchange rate, the half-life of price differentials in UJ and UU city pairs conditional on distance and other controls would be statistically equal. The same applies to the volatility of innovations in price differentials. As in the U.S./Canada case, we conclude that the border effect is confounded with other factors, notably the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, so that conventional methods to assess the what happens in our case. For many UU city pairs second largest eigenroot is close to the largest eigenroot in absolute value and it tends to be of a different sign thus dampening the deviation from steady state more quickly than the largest eigenroot alone might suggest. Like in U.S./Canada case, half-lives greater than 20 years are coded as missing (approximately 2% of the sample). 35 We continue using l=4 for the U.S./Japan case.
border effect provide overstated estimates because of the country heterogeneity, persistence, and nominal exchange rate biases with nominal exchange rate effect being particularly important.
Concluding remarks
The border effects estimated from price data are often implausibly large. Moreover, significant border effects are found where they should not be found. We take these facts as indication that the commonly applied methodology makes assumptions that do not hold in the data. We show that the border effect can be confounded with factors that are unrelated to costs of crossing the border. Specifically, we identify three effects-country heterogeneity, persistence and nominal exchange rate effects-that can inflate the border effect so that the distance equivalent of the border can be of cosmic sizes. To address these problems, we develop a simple framework that separates the border effect from these confounding factors even in two-country cases.
We apply our approach to price data collected by Engel and Rogers (1996) for a sample of U.S. and Canadian cities and price data collected by Parsley and Wei (2001) for a sample of U.S. and Japanese cities. In sharp contrast to Engel and Rogers (1996) , Parsley and Wei (2001) and other studies, we find no evidence of the border effect after controlling for factors confounding the border effect, i.e., cross-border price differentials behave in statistically and economically not distinguishable way from within-country price differentials. In the sample of U.S. and Canadian data, the border effect disappears once country-heterogeneity is taken into account. In the case of the U.S. and Japan, where exchange rate movements are larger, the barrier of the border is the exchange rate and the border itself has no significant effect on the dispersion of price differentials across the two countries. Note: Distance-adjusted dispersion is computed as the residual in the regression of dispersion on log distance between cities. Note: Distance-adjusted dispersion is computed as the residual in the regression of dispersion on log distance between cities. Note: Coefficients in panels A and B are multiplied by 1000. CC is the dummy variable for Canada-Canada city pairs, Border is the dummy variable for US-Canada pairs (UC dummy). Omitted category is US-US city pairs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The benchmark specification is (11). Border effect is computed according to (12). City and good category dummies are included but not reported. Note: Coefficients in panel A are multiplied by 1000. CC is the dummy variable for Canada-Canada city pairs, Border is the dummy variable for US-Canada pairs (UC dummy). Omitted category is US-US city pairs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The benchmark specification is (11). Border effect is computed according to (12). In Panel A volatility of innovations is the st. dev. of residuals in (16) (columns 1 and 2) and in (13) (columns 3 and 4). Half-lives in Panel B are computed from (16) (columns 1 and 2) and (13) (columns 3 and 4). Number of lags to remove short term dynamics in (13) and (16) is 6 (bimonthly data). City and good category dummies are included but not reported. P is the price of good k in city i at time t, P it is the Consumer Price Index for city i at time t. Coefficients in panels A and B are multiplied by 1000. CC is the dummy variable for Canada-Canada city pairs, Border is the dummy variable for US-Canada pairs (UC dummy). Omitted category is US-US city pairs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The benchmark specification is (11). Border effect is computed according to (12). City and good category dummies are included but not reported. Note: Coefficients in panels A-B are multiplied by 1000. JJ is the dummy variable for Japan-Japan city pairs, Border is the dummy variable for US-Japan pairs (UJ dummy). Omitted category is US-US city pairs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The benchmark specification is (11). Border effect is computed according to (12). City and good category dummies are included but not reported. Note: Coefficients in panels A are multiplied by 1000. JJ is the dummy variable for Japan-Japan city pairs, Border is the dummy variable for US-Japan pairs (UJ dummy). Omitted category is US-US city pairs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The benchmark specification is (11). Border effect is computed according to (12). In Panel A volatility of innovations is the st. dev. of residuals in (16) (columns 1 and 2) and in (13) (columns 3 and 4). Half-lives in Panel B are computed from (16) (columns 1 and 2) and (13) (columns 3 and 4). Number of lags to remove short term dynamics in (16) and (13) is 4 (quarterly data). City and good category dummies are included but not reported. Note: tests are for levels with intercept only. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. Number of lags to remove short term dynamics is 6 for U.S.-Canada case (bimonthly data) and 4 for U.S.-Japan (quarterly data). Bartlett kernel with plug-in Newey-West bandwidth selection is used for PP-Fisher. See Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) , Breitung (2000) , Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) , Maddala and Wu (1999, ADF-Fisher) and Choi (2001, PP-Fisher) for details. P is the price of good k in city i at time t, P it is the Consumer Price Index for city i at time t. Half-life is in the bimonthly periods. Half-lives greater than 10 years are coded as missing (less than 2% of the sample). ( ) x σ is the time series standard deviation of variable x.
Decomposition of volatility
To derive (9), substitute (7) and (8) To derive (10), rearrange terms in (3) as follows: 
